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696 KATENKAMP V. SUPERIOR COURT. [16 C. (2d) 
[So F. No. 16449. In Bank.-December 16, 1940.] 
J. F. KATENKAMP, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR 
COURT OF SANTA BARBARA COUNTY, Respond-
ent. 
[1] MANDAMUS-To COURTS AND COURT OFFICERS-GENERAL CONSIDERA-
TIONS-COMPELLING ENTERTAINING OF JURISDICTION-AFTER ERRO-
NEOUS DECISION AS TO JURISDICTION. - If a c(}urt is mistaken in 
its assumption that it does not possess the requisite jurisdiction, 
manaam'U8 will issue to compel it to assume jurisdiction. 
[2] INJUNCTION-TRIAL AND JUDGMEN~UDGMENT-WHEN EFFECTIVE. 
A judgment pro'\'iding that "it is hereby ordered ••• that a manda~ 
tory injunction issue" commanding the defendant to remove certain 
structures, and that defendant "be • • . perpetually enjoined from 
building" such structures, does not, by reason of the variation in the 
language as to the mandatory and prohibitory provisions, indicate 
that the mandatory injunction was not to issue until a future time. 
[3] ID.-TRIAL AND JUDGMENT-JUDGMENT-FORM AND REQUlSlTES.-A 
mandatory injunction commanding defendant to remove from and 
in front (}f certain described property two certain structures known 
as groins, is not ambiguous. 
[4] CORPORATIONS-DISSOLUTION OR FORFEITURE-GENERAL CONSIDERA-
TION-EFFECT OF DISSOLUTION-PENDING ACTION.-The validity of 
a judgment in an injunction suit against a corporation is n(}t af-
fected by the c(}rporation's disposition of its property and dis-
solution pending the suit, in view of Civil Code, section 399. . 
[5] INJUNCTIONS-TRIAL AND JUDGMENT-JUDGMENT-CONCLUSIVENESS 
-·PERSONS BOUND.-Though an injunction is issued against a cor-
poration alone, it binds not only the so-called "corporate entity," 
but also all persons who act for the corporation in the transaction 
of its business and have knowledge of the decree. It therefore binds 
one who was the sole shareholder in the corporation during its 
existence, the successor in interest to its property on dissolution 
and in control of the corporate affairs, and who was served with the 
injunctipn. 
1. Mandamus to compel court to assume jurisdiction where it has 
refused to proceed on ground of supposed lack of jurisdiction, notes, 
4 A. L. R. 582; 82 A. L. R. 1163. See, also, 16 Cal. Jur. 824; 18 
R. C. L. 295. 
McK. Dig. References: 1. Mandamus, § 38; 2 Injunctions, § 74; 3. 
Injunctions, § 74 (1); 4. Corporations, § 822; 5. Injunctions, § 74 (2).; 
6. Corporations, § 5. ' 
~ 
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[6] CORPORATIONS-INTRODUCTORy-DISREGARD OF CORPORATE ENTITY.-
Both law and equity will disregard the separate entity of a cor· 
poration whenever necessary to circumvent fraud or protect the 
rights of third persons. 
PROCEEDING in Mandamus to compel the Superior Court 
of Santa Barbara County to proceed with contempt proceed-
ings. Writ granted. 
Leland Crawford and J. F. Goux for Petitioner. 
Heany, Price, Postel & Parma for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Petitioner and other persons, owners of 
beach property in Santa Barbara County, recovered a judg-
ment in the Superior Court of that cOUIity on July 20, 1937, 
ordering the Union Realty Company to remove two groins 
upon its property which were causing the beach of the plain-
tiff's property to be washed away and accordingly found to 
be nuisances. The judgment also enjoined the corporation 
from erecting on its property any structure which would m-
terfere with the normal flow of the tides. The judgment was 
affirmed by the District Court of Appeal for the Second Dis-
trict and this court denied a petition for a hearing, where-
upon remittitur was filed. 
Four months before the decision in the trial court the 
Union Realty Company executed a deed of all its property 
to William J. Knapp, then the owner of all the issued and out-
standing shares of stock of the corporation, and thereafter 
filed a certificate of dissolution with the Secretary of State 
and went out of existence. Following the return of the re-
mittitur, the judgment in the injunction suit was served upon 
Knapp who failed to remove the groins as ordered. Plain-
tiffs then instituted contempt proceedings against him, serv-
ing on him an order to show cause why he should not be 
held in contempt for failing to comply with the injunction. 
This proceeding was before a different judge from the one 
who heard the original action. Knapp, appearing specially, 
maintained that the court had no jurisdiction on the grounds 
that it had never actually issued a mandatory injunction 
6. Disregarding corporate existence, notes, 1 A. L. R. 610; 34 
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698 KATENKAMP V. SUPERIOR COURT. ,[16 C. (2d) 
commanding Knapp or any other person to remove the groins 
and that Knapp was never a party to the action. The court 
thereupon quashed the order to show cause and dismissed 
the proceedings. One of the plaintiffs now petitions this 
court for a writ of mandate to the Superior Court of Santa 
Barbara County directing it to proceed with the contempt 
proceedings. 
[1] If a court is mistaken in its assumption that it does 
not possess the requisite jurisdiction, mandamus will issue 
to compel it to assume jurisdiction. (Golden Gate Tile Co. v. 
Superior Oourt, 159 Cal. 474 [114 Pac. 978]; City of San 
Diego v. Andrews, 195 Cal. 111 [231 Pac. 726] ; Pacific States 
Corp. v. Superior Court, 72 Cal. App. 241 [236 Pac. 938].) 
Such writ does not purport to interfere with the court's dis-
cretion in deciding the case. If, as plaintiff alleges, a valid 
mandatory injunction has been issued binding upon Knapp, 
the lower court's refusal to proceed with contempt proceedings 
leaves the plaintiff with no adequate or immediate remedy to 
enforce the judgment unless he petitions for a writ of man-
date to compel the lower court to exercise jurisdiction. 
[2] The judgment of the trial court in the injunction suit 
provided: "Now, therefore, it is hereby ordered, adjudged, 
and decreed that a mandatory injunction issue out of this 
court commanding defendant to forthwith permanently re-
move from, upon, and in front of the property hereinafter 
described, those two certain structures known as groins, 
. . . " Respondent contends that herein there was no manda-
tory injunction but only an order for a mandatory injunc-
tIon, the terms of which were to be fixed by the court at 
the time of its issuance in the futUre. He maintains that 
there can be no contempt of court until the mandatory in-
junction actually issues and that the petitioner must there-
fore first proceed to procure a writ of injunction from the 
trial court before the alleged contemnor could be held in 
contempt of court. 
This contention is without merit. In advancing his argu-
ment respondent points to the different phraseology used by 
the court in the same judgment with regard to the prohibi-
tory injunction: "It is further ordered, adjudged, and de-
creed that defendant, its officers, agents, employees, and/or 
servants, be and they and each of them are hereby perpetu-
ally enjoined from building upon or in front of the herein~ 
~ 
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above described real property any structure upon the shore, 
into the waters of Miramar Bay or the Pacific Ocean, which 
has the effect of changing the normal and natural condition 
of the tides, currents, and/or littoral drift of the waters 
fronting and/or upon the properties of plaintiffs, or any of 
them. " A mere variance in language, however, does not 
signify that while the prohibitory injunction was intended to 
take effect immediately, the mandatory injunction was not 
to issue until a futUre time. The judgment seems plainly one 
in which both a mandatory and prohibitory injunction were 
issued on the same ba.sis. Thus the trial court states its con-
clusions of law as follows:" That plaintiffs are entitled to a 
mandatory injunction of this Cmtrt requiring said defendant 
to forthwith permanently remove said groins and each of them, 
from, upon and in front of its said property and are further 
entitled to a judgment of this Court pe1"petually enjoining 
said defendant from maintaining and using any struct1tre 
upon its said property in such a manner as to interfere with 
the natural and normal flow of the ocean currents, tides, 
and/or waters to and upon the properties of said plaintiffs, 
and each of them. LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED AC-
CORDINGLY." (Italics added.) Finding that plaintiffs 
were entitled to a mandatory and a prohibitory injunction, 
the trial court issued both in its judgment. 
While the present litigation began in October, 1936, it was 
not until March, 1940, that the case was finally disposed of on 
appeal enabling the plaintiffs to secure their injunctive relief. 
The entire proceedings in the trial court were concerned with 
the propriety of issuing such an injunction. The two appeals 
taken from such proceedings (Katenkamp v. Union Realty 
Co., 36 Cal. App. (2d) 602 [98 Pac. (2d) 239]; Katenkamp 
v. Union Realty Co., 6 Cal. (2d) 765 [59 Pac. (2d) 473]), 
involved the propriety of issuing a judgment embodying a 
mandatory injunction. The trial court obviously intended 
its judgment to be not a mere declaration of plaintiffs' right 
to relief upon application in the future, but a final disposi-
tion of the case granting to the plaintiffs the relief for which 
they prayed. 
[3] Respondent contends that he is entitled to know the 
precise command of the court before he can be held for con-
tempt. The injunction issued by the trial court in this case, 
however, embodies no ambiguity. It plainly orders the re-









700 KATENKAMP V. SUPERIOR COURT. [16 C. (2d) 
Respondent notes that a trial court can dissolve or amend 
an injunction where conditions warrant it and should con-
sider any changed conditions before enforcing an injunc-
tion. Thjs observation affords no basis for arguing that the 
judgment of the' trial court in the present case did not con-
stitute an existing enforceable mandatory injunction. 
[4] The corporation's disposition of its property and its 
dissolution prior to the issuance of judgment did not affect 
. the validity of the judgment. Section 399 of the Civil Code 
provides that "No action or proceeding to which ..I. corpora-
tion is a party shall abate by the dissolution of such corpora-
tion". 
[6] William J. Knapp was bound by the injunction is-
sued even though the named defendant in the action was the 
Union Realty Company. A corporation, as an artificial en-
tity, cannot of itself perform or refrain from performing an 
act; only its officers and agents can. An injunction against 
a corporation binds not only the so-called "corporate entity" 
but also all persons who act for the corporation in the trans-
action of its business and have knowledge of the decree. Dis-
obedience by such persons may subject them to punishment 
for contempt. (Norton v. Superior Oourt, 65 Cal. 496 [4 Pac. 
489] ; Golden Gate Oonsolidated Min. 00. v. Superior Oourt, 
65 Cal. 187 [3 Pac. 628] ; Drew v. Superior Oourt, 180 Cal. 
711 [182 Pac. 417] ; MoFarland v. Superior Oourt, 194 Cal. 
407 [228·Pac. 1033]; High, Injunctions, 4th ed., sec. 1443.) 
The fact that the injunction is issued against the corporation 
alone rather than against it, its officers, agents and em-
ployees, cannot change the application of this rule. An in-
junction issued against a corporation is in effect an in-
junction against the officers, agents, and employees. William 
J. Knapp as sole shareholder in the corporation during its 
existence, and successor in interest to its property on dissolu-
tion, was in control of the corporate affairs. Upon service 
of the injunction on him he was bound by its provisions. 
[6] Furthermore, while a corporation is usually regarded 
as an entity separate and distinct from its stockholders, both 
law and equity will, whenever necessary to circumvent fraud 
or protect the rights of third persons disregard this distinct 
existence and treat them as identical. (Wenban Estate v. 
Hewlett, 193 Cal. 675 [227 Pac. 723]; Wood Estate 00. v. 
Chanslor, 209 Cal. 24] [286 Pac. 1001]; Olark v. Millsap, 
~' 
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197 Cal. 765 [242 Pac. 918] ; Hotaling v. Hotaling, 193 Cal. 
368 [224 Pac. 455, 56 A. L. R. 734] ; Minifie v. Rowley, 187 
Cal. 481 [202 Pac. 673] ; Erkenbreoher v. Grant, 187 Cal. 7 
[200 Pac. 641] ; Stanford Hotel 00 .. v. M. Schwind 00., 180 
Cal. 348 [181 Pac. 780] ; 6A Cal. Jur. 75.) In the present 
case the injunction against the Union Realty Company is in 
effect against William J. Knapp, its sole shareholder, and 
contempt proceedings may properly be brought against him . 
Let the peremptory writ of mandate issue. 
Edmonds, J., Spence, J., pro tem., Shenk, J., Carter, J., 
Houser, J., and Gibson, C. J., concurred. 
[Crim. No. 4257. In Bank.-December 17, 1940.] 
In the Matter of the Application of FRANK S. CONNOR 
for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. 
[1] HABEAS CORPUS - GROUNDS FOR RELIEF - PARTICULAR GROUNDS-
DETENTION PENDING OR AFTER ApPEAL.-OrdinariIy, after convic-
tion, a convict cannot obtain his release on habeas corpus because 
of the alleged failure of the trial court on arraignment to inform 
him of his right to counsel, to appoint counsel to defend him, or to 
allow him time to procure legal assistance, where the point could 
have been raised on appeal or motion to vacate the judgment. The 
defendant may not tryout his contention piecemeal by successive 
proceedings attacking the judgment, and the writ of habeas corp1l$ 
may not be employed to serve the purposes of an appeal. 
[2] ID.-GROUNDS FOR RELIEF--GENERAL CONSIDERATION-IN GENERAL 
-FUNCTION OF WRIT.-The function of the writ of habeas corpu8 
is to . determine the legality of one's detention by an inquiry into 
the question of jurisdiction and the validity of the process on its 
1. See 13 Cal. Jur. 217, 236; 25 Am. Jur. 152, 162; 12 R. C. L. 
1185, 1192. 
MclL Dig. References: 1. Habeas Corpus, § 40; 2. Habeas Corpus, 
§ 12; 3. Habeas Corpus, § 8; 4. Habeas Corpus, § 61; 5. Habeas Corpus, 
§ 61; 6. Habeas Corpus, § 61; 7. Habeas Corpus, § 63; 8. Courts, § 77; 
9. Criminal Law, § 107; 10. Habeas Corpus, § 60; 11. Criminal Law, 
§ 110; 12. Criminal Law, § 110; 13, 17. Habeas Corpus, § 59; 14. 
Habeas Corpus, § 37; 15. Prisons and Prisoners, § 14; 16. Habeas 
Corpus, § 56; 18. Habeas Corpus, § 56; 19. Habeas Corpus, § 62; 20. 
Evidence, § 426a. 
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